Paul Harris adopts the position that U.S. policymakers, who played a leading role in negotiating the Montreal Protocol [on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer], were influenced by moral forces, such as concern with people in other countries and future generations. As a participant in the discussions that preceded the 1987 Montreal Protocol, I do not agree with the author.

One cannot, of course, categorically deny that morality played a part in driving the negotiations, but other forces like personal prestige and ideology may have played a more important role. What morality did exist among in some circles is embodied in the Morelia Declaration, a strange document issued in 1991, which promotes a mystical view of nature, an apocalyptic role for mankind, and equality for all species in a utopian world.

Ozone Science Misused: Is This Morality?

The drive to limit and eventually ban the production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) was driven by hyped fear of skin cancer. In the Federal Register in 1987, the Environmental Protection Agency claimed 3 million additional skin cancer deaths if CFCs were not controlled. At that time there was no scientific evidence to support such a prediction. Today, the evidence is decidedly against this prediction, but the EPA has not retracted or amended its cost-benefit analysis in the light of the new knowledge.

Before I discuss this evidence, let me comment on Harris' statement [on page 9]: "By their efficient use of the mass media, public opinion, lobbying efforts and court action, environmental groups have influenced public policy." There is nothing new in this: The Alar scare, the asbestos scare, and many other environmental issues received the same treatment at various times. But the author is naive, to say the least, when he asserts that "by promoting the environmental agenda these groups increased the salience of morality."

Harris lists as scientifically accepted all of the claimed adverse effects of ozone thinning. He probably has no way of knowing that none of these "scientific" points can stand up to scrutiny. At the time of the Protocol negotiations in 1987, there was no credible evidence that CFCs contributed significantly to stratospheric chlorine. There was no evidence that ozone depletion was taking place anywhere outside of the Antarctic region--and there is still no such evidence that can survive scrutiny. There is no evidence for any long-term upward trend in ultraviolet radiation at the earth's surface--such as might be expected from ozone depletion. And as far as skin cancer is concerned, we can now be reasonably sure, on the basis of actual experiments, that malignant melanoma does not depend on the thickness of the ozone layer; melanoma is hardly affected by UV-B, the band of ultraviolet radiation that's absorbed by ozone.

The only sensible policy seems to have come from former Secretary of the Interior, Don Hodel, who is quoted--disparagingly--as advocating that people protect themselves from solar radiation by wearing hats and sunglasses. In view of the new evidence this is good advice indeed.

Turning now to the proper use of scientific evidence, a matter of ethics and ultimately of morality, here is what the chief U.S. negotiator, Richard Benedick, had to say on page 2 of his book "Ozone Diplomacy": "Perhaps the most extraordinary aspect of the treaty was its imposition of substantial short-term economic costs to protect human health and the environment against unproved future dangers--dangers that rested on scientific theories rather than on firm data."

Again, on page 18: "In July 1987, practically on the eve of the final negotiating session in Montreal, NOAA concluded that the 'scientific community is currently divided as to whether existing data on ozone trends provides sufficient evidence... that a chlorine-induced ozone destruction is occurring.'"

Further: "Writing in 1989, [Prof.] Sherwood Rowland, [an originator of the CFC- ozone theory and fervent advocate of a ban on CFCs,] observed that 'statistical evaluation through 1986 gave no indication of any trend in global ozone significantly different from no change at all.'"

And again: As far as the Antarctic ozone hole is concerned, it did not "provide any clear signal for policymakers at that time. Scientists in 1986 and 1987 were far from certain that CFCs were involved in Antarctica."

Benedick does not mention the fact that as late as 1988 published information on stratospheric chlorine showed no upward trend, thus indicating that neither CFCs nor other manmade chemicals were contributing significantly to the known natural sources, like volcanoes and oceans. An article by MIT professor Ronald Prinn in a book edited by Sherwood Rowland, and published in 1988, makes this point very clear.

It is evident from the above quotes that the negotiators and their scientific supporters were not the least bit inhibited by the absence of scientific information--or indeed by the presence of contrary information. To quote Benedick again, the negotiators were quite aware of the "very real short-run economic dislocations" but viewed the whole matter as an "unusual challenge to diplomacy". Indeed, the Montreal Protocol was to become the first example of an international treaty controlling the production and release of a manmade chemical.

The Protocol, of course, contains a provision for amendments should new scientific evidence arise. So far, this provision has been used only to tighten restrictions: moving from a cap on CFC production to a rollback of 20%, then 50%, then 100%--a complete ban. In 1992, the production ban was accelerated by five years based on a press conference and media hype that merely suggested a possibility of an Arctic ozone hole--that never materialized.

It is significant that there has been no pressure exerted by governments to modify the Montreal Protocol, now that contrary scientific evidence has appeared. For example, the issue as to whether ozone is being depleted globally is in dispute. The reports of an upward trend in ultraviolet radiation at the earth's surface were demonstrated to be spurious and based on an incorrect application of statistical analysis. Finally, laboratory experiments have concluded that the deadly form of skin cancer, malignant melanoma, is produced by a band of ultraviolet radiation that is not absorbed by ozone. Hence, the EPA's estimate of an additional 3 million deaths from skin cancer is wildly incorrect. We are still waiting for the EPA to publish such a correction and for the parties to the Montreal Protocol to institute amendments based on the new scientific evidence.

Morality and the International Dimension

We can now address the matter of morality of the various parties involved in the Montreal Protocol and in subsequent amendments. The industrial companies manufacturing substitutes for CFCs and similar chemicals have been pressing vociferously for a complete ban, hoping to profit from their investments and the sale of more costly substitutes. They even set up a front organization called "The Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy". It was later renamed "The Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy". It has funded a large public relations campaign to advance the ban on CFCs and has helped the IRS and EPA in tracking down black markets and smuggling of CFCs, inevitable consequences of the production ban. It is amusing to observe the ongoing fight being carried on by the Alliance against extreme environmental organizations that want to phase out the CFC substitutes because of their alleged ozone-destroying potential.

Of course, the key to the CFC content of the atmosphere is eventually in the hands of the developing countries that make up the bulk of the world's population. These countries have asked for side-payments, properly referred to as bribes, in order to accede to the Protocol. The position of India and China on this score is quite straightforward and perhaps more honest than the position of the industrialized countries. Quoting from Harris [p.25]: "India declared that it would encourage other developing countries that were already parties to the Montreal Protocol to withdraw if no new money was pledged by the industrialized countries." The 1990 London Conference obligingly set up the Interim Multilateral Fund.

To the developing countries the Protocol is simply a means to advance their concept of "international equity," which began nearly 25 years ago with the New International Economic Order. "China and India threatened to increase their uses of CFCs, thereby 'breaking' the Montreal Protocol if the fund was not approved." Harris then recounts how the United States finally gave in to blackmail by "the major international donors joined with the developing states and the World Bank" (which would administer the funds.) In April 1990, Congress authorized money for the new multilateral fund so that the U.S. would not "forfeit its leadership role on ozone depletion". Naturally, environmental groups, but also "American corporate chiefs," had been pressuring the Bush Administration to reverse its decision to oppose the fund. Unfortunately, Harris does not identify the corporations, but we can guess who they might be.

The position of the common people in the developing countries--as opposed to their bureaucrats and international negotiators--is well expressed by an article in the March 12, 1994, issue of The Spectator (London):

"...the consequences of banning CFCs will certainly be disastrous...The proposed replacements are less efficient and some of them are toxic, endangering the health of fridge workers and people nearby. In Africa, refrigeration saves lives, not only by protecting food against decay and disease but by preserving medicines, notably vaccines. Anything that makes refrigeration more expensive or more difficult will cost lives in Africa and add to poverty; and anything that adds to poverty in Africa increases the destruction of the African environment...Somehow it is all right for people in the West to benefit from modern technology but wrong for poor people in Africa and Asia. It is more wholesome for black Africans to die in infancy of 'natural' agents such as malaria and food poisoning than to be safeguarded into healthy old age by unnatural agents such as pesticides and CFCs. The outstanding feature of the Greens is that they are rich. The outstanding feature of their victims is that they are poor."

The bitter irony, not mentioned in the article, is that even if the CFC-ozone theory were correct in all respects, darker-skinned people living in the tropics would get none of the alleged benefits of "protecting" the ozone layer. The depletion of ozone is calculated to occur mainly at middle and high latitudes, and skin cancers are confined almost exclusively to fair-skinned people. What then is the incentive for tropical nations to phase out CFCs? And if they don't go along, will it be worthwhile for the developed countries to impose high costs on their citizens for a negligible return, in the absence of full international participation?

If Not Morality, What Then?

I can comment from personal knowledge--having worked closely with Dr. William Graham, Reagan's Science Adviser--on how the United States got into the Montreal Protocol. Harris correctly quotes Lynton Caldwell, who observed that the White House delegated environmental decisions to subordinates. As a result, an alliance between bureaucrats at the lower levels at the State Department and EPA was able to push the U.S. position past their superiors. By the time it reached the White House it could no longer be stopped. This was carried out under great pressure from non-governmental environmental organizations and congressional staff who saw the Protocol as a unique opportunity to advance their own special interests. In the case of Benedick, his special interest had been control of world population growth; but when frustrated by the position of the Reagan White House at the Mexico City Conference, he quickly turned to global environmental issues.

Quite specious (and wrong) is the analysis by Peter Haas, quoted extensively and approvingly by Harris. His "epistemic community" seems to be distinguished by its complete disregard for scientific data. Their "principled values" and "common policy goals" revolved around bureaucratic incentives. To suggest that this community was shaped mainly by moral concerns is laughable. Harris simply confuses words with incentives when he quotes a U.S. diplomat, whose obvious aim in life based on the existing reward structure would be to conclude treaties.

In his conclusion Harris finally acknowledges that "power relationships-- primarily economic ones--were the most important determinants of U.S. policy." He claims that morality also played an important role, but I don't think he has made his point.